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on the Future of  Man
Stephen Zepke
The sun rises. This first image of  2001: A Space Odyssey so memorably
accompanied by Richard Strauss’s Also Sprach Zarathustra appears as a
portent, as a vision of  things to come, and as an echo of  these words
of  Nietzsche’s:
Zarathustra has become ripe, my hour has come!
‘This is my morning, my day begins: rise up now, rise up, great
noontide!’1
2001 is not just “about” Nietzsche’s noontide, it is an ambitious effort
to project us into a new future by overcoming the human, all too human.
In doing so the film extends science-fiction cinema both technically
and philosophically, offering images of  the future more convincing
than any seen before, but as well, the film explores a new ontology of
the future and every epic surge extending its vast temporal sweep defines
the future in terms of  transformation. First, man’s transformation into
himself  and then man’s transformation into something else – the
overman. In this way Kubrick’s 1968 film echoes the French philosopher
Gilles Deleuze’s contemporaneous interpretation of  Nietzsche’s eternal
return, one in which the future emerges as the return of  the new, and
everything known and established is overcome, not least man himself.2
Deleuze is vital to our appreciation of  what 2001 achieves, because it is
his insistence on the importance of  this future that allows us to read
the film philosophically – a philosophy that cannot, as we shall see, be
separated from its aesthetic merits. This is to explore, for real, the
possibilities of a cinema-thought, one that attempts to enact a
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transformation worthy of  its Nietzschean inspiration rather than simply
cataloguing its possible allegorical references. If  there is a necessity to
another – Deleuzean – essay about 2001 it is this; the literature to date
has often been distracted by the film’s references, at the cost of  a
satisfactory account of  its meaning.
The Dawn of  Man
2001 is not simply an allegory of  Zarathustra, it locates
Nietzsche’s tale of  man’s overcoming in our future, a future we have
already been living inasmuch as it is a future of  pure becoming, a time
of  continual transformation. The future has in this sense always been
with us, a fact Kubrick shows us by starting from the beginning, from
man’s birth. The film begins with still photos repeating an endless dawn,
until the camera moves, life appears, and we see our ancestors the apes.
We quickly learn much of  their life; they coexist with tapirs, are hunted
by leopards, confront each other at a waterhole, and eat grass. Death
surrounds them, and every shot is filled with bones. But the apes are
oblivious to death, for it is as much a part of  their life as everything
else, and their existence has not yet turned into a question. But all this
is about to change. The first close-up of  the film is of  an ape’s face
turned to watch the sunrise. It is followed by the first point of  view
shot, as we see what the ape sees, the rosy fingers of  dawn. The individual
is slowly awakening. But the dawn also reveals something else, a tall
thin black monolith standing before the slumbering apes. Utterly
incongruous, utterly alien. It stands there as the impossible – a pure
disjunction – a doorway to an existence that cannot yet be seen. The
apes awake and react with fear. But the monolith neither runs away nor
attacks, the monolith – and this is the very essence of  its alien appearance
– does not move, its black insistence the only unmoving thing in this
world’s infinite rhythm of  fight or flight, of  night and day, of  life and
death. The monolith is what does not live, and yet is not the same as
death. Or, perhaps better, the monolith stands outside the eternal and
unchanging rhythm of  life and death, it breaks into their symmetrical
economy. The apes are forced to investigate, to touch and taste and
smell, and further: to evaluate. The appearance of  the monolith has
caused reflection. The apes have not yet begun to think, but they have
been forced to confront their outside, an act that opens a space between
the sensations of  their perceptions and their bodies’ action.
This space – a space Deleuze, following Bergson, will call the
brain – has been created by the monolith for an act of  insemination,
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an act that will bear its fruit after a very rapid gestation. As Deleuze has
pointed out: “The black stone of  2001 presides over both cosmic states
and cerebral stages: it is the soul of  the three bodies, earth, sun and
moon, but also the seed of  the three brains, animal, human, machine.”3
Kubrick shows us this seed – the moon and sun – appearing as if
emitted from the monolith itself, a vision signalling our first return (it
will be repeated another three times) to the cosmic alignment of  the
opening shot.4 The apes’ brain provides the womb now impregnated
with a new future, and within which this seed of  the future will grow.
Emerging between sensation and action, reflection gives birth to
consciousness, and the ape is overcome in stepping beyond its animal
body and into an abstract outside, into the consciousness of  man.
Kubrick shows us this process very precisely: An ape scuffs
into the skeleton of  a tapir, looking for food. It stops, it looks up, it
remembers. It sees the image of  the monolith in alignment with sun
and moon. But this “vision” appears without a shot of the ape looking,
because it doesn’t show us what the ape “sees”, but is a point-of-view
shot onto a new landscape, that of  thought. Here man emerges in a
mental image of  his own conception, a thought by which humanity
escapes the earth and rises into a new outside that is nevertheless entirely
internal: consciousness. The ape looks around at the bones, distracted.
He picks one up and lets it fall, again and a bone is propelled spiralling
towards us, and with the rising kettle drums and horns of  Strauss’s
Zarathustra once more peaking, the ape fully grasps the idea and brings
the bone down in the middle of  the tapir skull. From the memory of
the monolith the ape has moved to a thought of  the future, as we see
a tapir fall dead to the ground. This shot of  the ape’s mind’s eye is a
vision of  supremacy inseparable from an ecstatic explosion of  joy, a
celebration of  power. As we shall see this indiscernability of  thought
and affect marks an expressive immanence of  body and brain that is
soon to be overcome.
And between these two ‘idea shots’ – on the one hand of  the
monolith and on the other the falling tapir – between their before and
after, their past and future, the expanse of  the ape’s new outside is fully
revealed. Thought has emerged into time. Or better, thought has
emerged as time. The ape’s thought of  cause and effect is nothing but
the connection of  a past with a future, and this emergence of  conscious
time overcomes the cycle of  life and death by thinking the present, and
by making the ape its master. This emergence of  the human – our dawn
– has been achieved through the monolith, but what – and this is the
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fundamental problem of  the film – is the monolith? The monolith is the
new, and its appearance on earth is inseparable from the emergence of
thought and time, the emergence of  an outside as the power of  the
future. This is why the film starts with nine stills of  sunrises, they are
dawns without change, and remain in a timeless, eternal now. This now is
pierced by the monolith, it is the event creating time. This creation of
a new future is inseparable from destruction, a point Kubrick emphasises
by showing us two shots of  a tapir’s fall. “He who has to be a creator
always has to destroy.”5 Man is born as an embodiment of  the monolith’s
power of  radical disruption, he signals a new dawn, the arrival of  a
new future, the future of  the human, all too human.
The monolith – we must never forget this – made man think.
The monolith therefore made man, both created the womb and
provided the seed from which man was born. But what is the monolith?
The monolith is an impervious outside, an utterly impossible alien being
that forces the ape to reflect, to open a time and space between sensation
and action. This space is outside the timeless moment of  the ape’s life
on earth, an outside that is at the same time the new inside of  human
consciousness. But although the monolith is the genetic disjunction
that creates thought, it cannot itself  be thought. The monolith is man’s
immanent exterior, an internal outside that is the condition of  his
overcoming. The monolith as creative disjunction is, in Nietzsche’s
terms, the will to power – the ontological power of  the future qua
becoming – a power man contains, elaborates and affirms (but finds so
hard to think), until like the rising sun he reaches his noontide and
overcomes himself, returning – transfigured – as an innocent child.6
2001, as we shall see, will end with this overcoming of  man, but man’s
birth has already established, as the secret of  the monolith and the destiny
of  man, the eternal return of  the future as the power of  overcoming.7
But meanwhile, for the course of  the film, no one, not even
our hero Dave Bowman, has the faintest idea of  what the monolith
announces. The monolith will remain for humanity, to quote Dr.
Heywood Floyd, “totally inert, its origin and purpose still a total
mystery.”8 Like the monolith, the process of  overcoming and its will to
power remains alien to human thought. This alien element, for Kubrick
and for Nietzsche, forms an ontological secret that can only be lived in
the process of  overcoming. But even as unthought the will to power
of  the monolith remains active, and man’s future emerges in spite of
his rational exertions. Nevertheless, it will only be in overcoming man’s
conscious rationality – exponentially raised into the computer HAL –
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that Dave Bowman, a man, becomes a new dawn. How will man, the
most rational of  animals achieve this? For Nietzsche it will be through
the body, and as we shall see, Kubrick pits the body against
consciousness in 2001’s climactic action scene, as the body emerges
victorious to step beyond infinity.
In a note from 1887-88 Nietzsche explains this conflict of  the
body and consciousness in a way that could be a script note from 2001:
The role of  “consciousness.” – It is essential that
one should not make a mistake over the role of
“consciousness:” it is our relation with the “outer world”
that evolved it. On the other hand, the direction or
protection and care in respect of the co-ordination of
the bodily functions does not enter our consciousness,
any more than spiritual accumulation: that a higher court
rules over these things cannot be doubted – a kind of
directing committee on which the various chief  desires
make their votes and power felt. “Pleasure,” “displeasure”
are hints from this sphere, also the act of  will, also ideas.
In summa: That which becomes conscious is
involved in causal relations which are entirely withheld
from us – the sequence of  thoughts, feelings, ideas in
consciousness does not signify that this sequence is a
causal sequence, but apparently it is so, to the highest
degree. Upon this appearance we have founded our whole
idea of  spirit, reason, logic, etc. (-none of  these exist:
they are fictitious syntheses and unities), and projected
into these things and behind things!
Usually, one takes consciousness itself  as the
general sensorium and Supreme Court, nonetheless, it is
only a means of  communication: it is evolved through
social intercourse – “Intercourse” here understood to
include the influences of  the outer world and the reactions
they compel on our side, also our effect upon the outer
world. It is not the directing agent, but an organ of  the
directing agent.9
This conflict between will to power expressed physiologically
in affects and represented by subjective consciousness is elaborated in
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of  Morals. Nietzsche argues that the
appearance of human rationality rests upon a morality that justifies it.
This morality takes on a temporal sense, as Nietzsche asks whether the
“good” man is “a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through
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which the present was possibly living at the expense of  the future?”10 In
other words, the advent of  human morality obscures the will to power
and its inhuman vital force of  overcoming under the reactive values of
good and evil, their living figure of  the “bad conscience” and its
metaphysics of  “ascetic ideals”. Both Nietzsche and 2001 offer a
genealogy of  culture in which an affirmative ecstasy gives way to the
ressentiment of  the “good”, and where active expression in affects is
negated by its representation in human consciousness. As Gene
Youngblood put it, “2001 is Stanley Kubrick’s interstellar morality play.”11
Although the apes of 2001 are not exactly the famed “blond
beasts of  prey” of  Nietzsche’s account, they seem to perform the same
function.12 In killing, the ape-beast celebrates his will to power, and
murder gives rise to the festival. At the end of  the fight at the waterhole
the screaming ape launches his bone skyward in celebration of  “a terrible
artists’ egotism.”13 It is as if  Nietzsche had seen the movie...
To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer
even more: this is a hard saying but an ancient, mighty,
human, all-too-human principle to which even the apes
might subscribe, for it has been said that in devising
bizarre cruelties they anticipate man and are, as it were,
his “prelude.” Without cruelty there is no festival: thus
the longest and most ancient part of  human history
teaches.14
But the festival has been repressed, and we no longer celebrate our
strength. The strong and active man is no longer seen as “good”, for
his victims defend themselves by proclaiming their oppressors “evil”,
founding their morality on this reactive “fact”. This morality of
ressentiment is justified by an ideal “good” that finds its highest form in
the Christian God. With God however, we have given ourselves a “bad
conscience”, for our bodies are always guilty in the face of  his ideal
truth. Faced with this metaphysical ideal we must become ascetics and
attempt to leave our bodies for the great “beyond”. Thus man takes
sides against himself, and nihilism is born.
Man in Space
At this point the prelude ends. For 2001 and for man. The
festival of  blood has suddenly become – in the famous edit that spans
millions of  years – a waltz. Man has emerged – it is almost as if  Nietzsche
was writing about this sequence – through “a forcible sundering from
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his animal past, as if  it were a leap and plunge into new surroundings
and conditions of  existence.”15 Despite the languid beauty of  the sudden
appearance of  space flight, it is from the moment when the ape turned
the weapon on himself  that this future has been born. This violence,
for Kubrick as much as for Nietzsche, is both horrifying and magnificent.
Nietzsche writes:
the existence on earth of  an animal soul turned
against itself, taking sides against itself, was something
so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic,
contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect
of  the earth was essentially altered. Indeed, divine
spectators were needed to do justice to the spectacle
that thus begun and the end of  which is not yet in
sight.16
The birth of  self-hatred is magnificent, Nietzsche (and Kubrick)
continues, because from it is born the man who “gives rise to an interest,
a tension, a hope, almost a certainty, as if  with him something were
announcing and preparing itself, as if  man were not a goal but only a
way, an episode, a bridge, a great promise. –” Man, and these are
Nietzsche’s words, is going to produce a “great child.”17
That man has not yet been introduced. Meanwhile the soft
notes of  Johann Strauss’s Blue Danube accompanies the utter disjunction
of  the bone become a spaceship. What is the meaning of  this cut?
There seems two possible answers. Perhaps it is that between then and
now nothing has changed, the weapon of  self-hatred remains, only
now in the form of  the orbiting nuclear bomb.18 Same shit, different
day. But on the other hand, everything has changed. Everything the
monolith’s cosmic perspective promised seems to have come true. The
grunting bestiality of  the apes has blossomed into the most graceful
of  visions, as we dance amongst the stars. But almost immediately the
occupants of  this world appear, and the first human we see is the
slumped sleeping figure of  Dr. Floyd. The ape’s triumphant roar has
turned into its opposite, a snore, and this transformation is hardly
reassuring. The pure activity of  the apes has turned into the pure
impassivity of  man. Or rather, man lies sleeping and passive in the
midst of  the enormous activity of  machines.
This cut from bone to spaceship, dizzying in its velocity, takes
us from the beginning of  our future in the birth of  human
consciousness, to the constant threat now circling the earth – the weapon
STEPHEN ZEPKE
44
in its alienated, machinic amplification. Kubrick’s cut therefore gives us
an utterly condensed genealogy of  humanity. It reveals both the origin
of  the future in the apes coming to consciousness, and the wrong
direction this development has taken, the spaceship that interrupts the
trajectory of  the bone. As the film now goes on to show, the instinctual
joy of  the apes’ violence, the immediacy of  their festive celebration of
power, has been transformed into intricate international relations
conducted through the repressed violence of  threat and the subterfuges
of  secrecy. The instinctual passions and affects of  the ape have become
the cold calculation of  a scientific consciousness, an interruption in
man’s instinctual will to power that now turns back against himself  in
human nihilism. Against such abomination Kubrick posits the same
solution as Nietzsche, man must be overcome.
Nietzsche explains this nihilism in On the Genealogy of  Morals.
History, he argues, has seen the emergence of  the human in its weakest
sense, of  the human justified through a metaphysical dimension that
turns against the predatory and instinctual strength of  our animal
physicality. By 2001, Kubrick argues, machines have become the
mechanisms of  this nihilistic will. The experimental consciousness born
in the first contact of  monolith and apes has turned into a techno-
scientific will-to-truth that transformed the bone into a spaceship. This
transformation has come at a price, a capitalisation of  consciousness
creating a seamless blend of  science and multi-national wealth, signified
by the logos of  Pan Am, IBM, and Bell telephones. And inside this
money-machine man is asleep. Every affectual relation is overcoded by
its techno-economic and political investments.19 From the films first
words between Floyd and the stewardess to his later conversation with
his daughter, from his confrontation with the Russians to the briefing
he gives on the moon, inter-personal relations are defined by the power
of  money and the State. Pierre Klossowski has claimed that Nietzsche
foresaw this capitalization of  value judgements defining the capitalist
Empire of  today.  He writes:
The point of  departure for [Nietzsche’s] projects is the
fact that the modern economy depends on science, and
cannot sustain itself  apart from science; and it rests on
the ‘powers of  money’, corporations, and on their armies
of  engineers and workers, whether skilled or not; and at
the level of  production, these powers cannot develop their
own techniques except through forms of  knowledge
required by the manipulation of  the objects they produce,
AGAINST NIHILISM
45
and through the laws that govern the exchange and
consumption of  these products.20
What is important is that this techno-scientific machine and its efficient
forms of  social control cannot produce the new, it can become more
efficient, but only at the price of  repressing its immanent force of
overcoming. Nevertheless this drive for efficiency, and here Nietzsche
and Kubrick once more come together, is going to produce a merge
of  man and machine.
In a note from 1888 Nietzsche writes:
Once we possess that common economic
management of  the earth that will soon be inevitable,
mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine
in the service of  this economy – as a tremendous
clockwork, composed of  ever more subtly “adapted”
gears; as an ever-growing superfluity of  all dominating
and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous
force, whose individual factors represent minimal forces,
minimal values.
In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation
of  man to a specialized utility, a reverse movement is
needed – the production of  a synthetic, summarizing, justifying
man for whose existence this transformation of  mankind
into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he
can invent his higher form of  being.
[…] Morally speaking this overall machinery,
this solidarity of  all gears, represents a maximum in the
exploitation of man; but it presupposes those on whose
account this exploitation has meaning.21
This man is Dr. Floyd – a man of  science, but also a “master” – who
will take this exploitative social machinery and turn it as creative as he
can; he will attempt to overcome man by launching the ultimate man-
machine HAL. Floyd wants to know the secret of  the monolith, and
he at least understands that man must be overcome if  he is to do so.
To the Moon
Dr. Floyd arrives at the Clavius moon base and goes straight
to a briefing meeting. His function is immediately revealed as both
scientific and military. On the one hand, he congratulates the audience
on their “discovery”, which, he says, “may well prove to be one of  the
most significant in the history of  science.” But on the other he asserts
STEPHEN ZEPKE
46
the need for “absolute secrecy in this matter” in order to avoid, as he
puts it, the “extremely grave potential for cultural shock and social
disorientation contained in this present situation, if  the facts were
suddenly made public without adequate preparation and conditioning.
Anyway, this is the view of  the Council.” Floyd’s function is to prepare
a “report” on when to “eventually” release the information, after, no
doubt, the appropriate amount of  public conditioning. Given that the
film was made in 1968 this speech can only have one meaning: in the
future we’re all working for the “Man”. “Oh” Floyd adds seemingly as
an afterthought, the Council has “requested” “formal security oaths”
from anyone with “any knowledge of  this event”. This man, Dr. Floyd,
is working for a government, a techno-military amalgam of  state power
and private finance that demands absolute servitude, and where oaths
don’t work, manipulation of  affect will. The violence that with the
apes was festive now compels obedience.22 Mind control has conquered
the body, confined it – floating – in space, while consciousness has
thrust forward, hatching its cold hard plans.
Dr. Floyd now goes to see the monolith for himself, which
has turned up on the moon. On the way we get the facts, the scientific
ones anyway, about what, as they say, the “damn” thing is. It was, he’s
told, “deliberately buried” over “four million years ago”. At this Floyd
balks, he repeats “deliberately buried”, snorts a laugh and shakes his
head in a gesture echoing that of  the ape, when he had the first idea.
Floyd too, has had an idea. His thought, in sci-fi terms, is: “there’s
something out there.” Floyd has had an intimation of  the alien. He
feels this thought, it provokes him. But entirely inadequate to the
sensation, he shrugs it off  and turns his thoughts elsewhere, outwards
and not in. The drama of  Floyd’s encounter with the monolith is given
in a hand-held camera sequence following his group down the ramp
into the archaeological site where they are excavating their future. The
men circle the monolith warily, before Floyd extends his hand and
touches it in a gesture that recalls the apes at the beginning. Once more
the monolith appears on a stage, once more it is surrounded by those
eager to test it, and once more it gives a sign that will be misunderstood,
but nevertheless followed.
The men line up for a photograph in front of  their discovery,
proud archaeologists. They are happily unaware that what they take to
be the past, an ancient past they never knew, and have only now
unearthed, is something that in fact brought them here, to this moment
when it would be revealed once more in order to activate their future.
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Emerging from its long lunar night the sun rises. And as the sun’s rays
touch the monolith, once more in alignment with it and the earth, we
see the cosmos open up, sundered by a high-pitched tone resounding
painfully. The monolith has returned, and once more it appears as a
brutal disjunction. Floyd and his men try to cover their ears, a comical
exercise when wearing a space-helmet, before the screen goes black,
and we are plunged into the darkness preceding another new dawn.
Jupiter Mission, 18 months later
At first, 18 months later, things don’t look so different, as
another spaceship floats into view. But this one is truly huge, befitting
its doubled gestation, exactly twice as long as a human’s. Once more
the monolith’s appearance in conjunction with earth, moon and sun
has given rise to the new; an Übermaschine whose name is HAL, and to
whom we will soon be introduced. But first we must note HAL’s
ambiguous origins, as his paternity appears disputed. On the one hand
we already know the generative significance of  the monolith, its power
of creation, and its re-appearance on the moon is surely no accident.
But on the other, man’s existence in space has been made possible by a
techno-science that expresses his unquenchable will-to-truth. With man
in control the monolith remains secret, and its discovery is merely the
spur, the external rather than the internal reason for techno-science
and money to reproduce itself  in a higher form. We can already sense
then, that this mission to Jupiter will pit the creative rights of  the
monolith against those of  man, the will to power against all the
metaphysical ideals, and their mechanical representations, that man has
erected in its place.
We see a man shadow-boxing his way around the great ship’s
interior circumference, orbiting its circle in a way that defies gravity, if
not logic. Meanwhile another astronaut emerges into a passage which
is itself  revolving, and which he makes his way along, towards us. We
see this played out in reflection, in what appears to be a big red light
that we will soon recognize as a computer eye. This man emerges into
the centre of  the space that the other has been running around, although
the latter is now seated and eating above the second astronaut, who
“descends” a ladder and walks around to him. There is no up or down
in this world, and the camera will do all it can to continually remind us
of  this fact. “Up” and “down” have lost their bearings, they have become
purely relative terms that depend entirely on one’s perspective.
Nevertheless there does exist an arbiter of  meaning in this world, one
STEPHEN ZEPKE
48
Nietzsche calls a “Spirit of  Gravity,” both  gives things their proper
weight, and bears them.23 This is HAL, to whom we are now introduced.
The astronauts watch themselves being interviewed on a BBC
program that gives us the background to their mission. This is, the
announcer tells us, the first manned attempt to reach Jupiter and consists
of  five crew members and “one of  the latest generation of  the HAL
9000 computer.” We are also told that three of  the humans are in
“hibernation”, and that the interview will be conducted with the two
who are awake, “mission commander” Dr. Dave Bowman, and his
“deputy” Dr. Frank Poole. But the interviewer is really interested in
HAL, “the latest result in machine intelligence,” who can, the interviewer
tells us, “reproduce – although some experts still prefer to use the
word “mimic” – most of  the activities of  the human brain, and with
incalculably greater speed and reliability.” This line makes three important
points. 1) HAL is a “machine intelligence,” this combination of  words
already indicating the possibility of  a new hybridity of  machine and
man. 2) He “reproduces,” a word left strangely hanging by the
interviewer to suggest a reproductive power machines may have claimed
for their own. 3) Once the question resumes, we learn that HAL
“reproduces” or “mimics” “most” functions of  the human brain. This
introduces the question as to whether HAL is human, or at least to
what extent. This question will be central to the action on board, and
has three elements. First, does HAL mark the overcoming of  man by
a super-man-machine, a machine with “most” human attributes, only
working, as the interviewer informs us “with incalculably greater speed
and reliability”? Second, does HAL, like humans, have emotions?24
HAL therefore poses the question: Can capitalism and science join
forces to overcome man, to fulfil the destiny of  man’s consciousness
by replacing man with a super-machine? And third, does this machine
feel, and here we are thrust into the realm of  corporeality once more,
and its relation to rational thought.
These questions complicate what is an obvious and well-known
narrative. HAL is not simply a cold, hard mechanism whose hubris at
believing in its own perfection – an arrogance indiscernible from evil,
for it seeks to replace God  – will also be the Achilles heel leading to its
defeat.25 The next question makes this obvious. HAL is asked: “You
have an enormous responsibility on this mission, in many ways perhaps
the greatest responsibility of  any single mission element. You’re the
brain and central nervous system of  the ship and your responsibilities
include watching over the men in hibernation. Does this ever cause
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you any lack of  confidence?” It’s as if  the interviewer senses that HAL
needs a therapist. No doubt the question is a reflection of  HAL’s
“enormous responsibility”, the weight of  life and death that man has
passed into the hands of  a machine. But at the same time, HAL’s
“responsibility” suggests human feelings – and possible failings – not
only confidence, but also care, compassion and empathy. As if  to
emphasise these characteristics we are told HAL is “the brain and central
nervous system of  the ship”, the brain and the body, a body in which
the hibernating men sleep.26 The astronauts dwell within the protective
body of  HAL, and trust in his desire to keep them alive, in his humanity.
There is, then, something maternal about HAL, something physical
and womb-like, something that evokes trust.
We hear HAL’s soft and melodious voice: “Let me put it this
way,” he replies, “the 9000 computer is the most reliable computer
ever made, no 9000 computer has ever made a mistake or distorted
information.” But there is also a divergence here, an unsettling one,
because as HAL utters these words, the shot changes from that of  his
red eye to HAL’s point-of-view, that of  a fish-eye camera which has
Dave and Frank, oblivious and eating their dinner, under surveillance:
pure menacing technology. There is a disjunction between HAL’s
comforting words and what we see of  his world-view; a security guard’s
mentality, filled with paranoid fears lurking just below the surface,
violence looking for an excuse. But the surface is, for now (a now we
are starting to feel with growing apprehension), unbroken, and HAL
blithely continues: “We are all, by any practical definition of  the words,
foolproof  and incapable of  error.” HAL speaks then, for a “we”, for a
plural, for - and now we have the meaning of  the word already used in
this interview - a “new generation.” Man’s technological utopia, its
perfectly functional efficiency and unquestioned authority has given
birth to this, our guardian and protector. As HAL’s reassurances increase,
so does our terror. Man depends on this super-machine, and can it,
really, be trusted?
Man has produced his overcoming, and his name is HAL.
The super-man as machine, homo machinus, a perfect machine
intelligence.27 The interviewer senses the disjunction here, senses how
we are all in comparison merely human. “HAL,” he asks, “despite your
enormous intellect are you ever frustrated by your dependence on people
to carry out actions?” We are starting to get at the meat of  the matter
here, at corporeality and its affects. Does HAL resent man’s body and
in this way cross the line between being a cold machine and having a
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heated emotion? “Not in the slightest bit,” HAL calmly responds, he
enjoys working with people. In fact, he is “constantly occupied”, and
is, he contentedly explains, “putting myself  to the fullest possible use,
which is all I think that any conscious entity can ever hope to do.”
Finally then, HAL claims humanity not on the basis of  having emotions
but through economic and scientific criteria, with him consciousness
achieves its “fullest possible use.”
HAL’s overcoming of  man echoes Nietzsche’s vision of
science as the most modern version of  the “ascetic ideal.” The ascetic
ideal emerges in the third essay of  On the Genealogy of  Morals as the
evaluation of  things according to an immaterial “beyond.” As such the
ascetic ideal is the final perversion of  the will to power, where it
renounces the body in a nihilistic will to nothingness. To renounce the
body is the asceticism required to reach the beyond, to renounce the
affects in the name of  a cold, hard, absolute truth. To “downgrade
physicality to an illusion; […] To renounce belief  in one’s ego, to deny
one’s own “reality” – what a triumph!” What would this renunciation
of  the body in the name of  a “true world” mean, Nietzsche asks, and
it is a question that the asexual HAL answers perfectly, “but to castrate
the intellect?”28
2001 is, in this sense, a classic example of  science fiction as a
self-reflexive genre, as it reflects on the morality of  science itself. 2001
however, gives this generic gesture a genealogical depth by following
Nietzsche and arguing that the metaphysics of  the “true world” have
not disappeared with the old faith, but have found a new form in the
patient scientific observation of  earth.29 Science, Nietzsche argues,
survives “well enough without God, the beyond, and the virtues of
denial.” Nevertheless, science is not an alternative to the ascetic ideal,
“but rather the latest and noblest form of  it.”30 Science is not concerned
with the high ideals of  the religio-philosophic beyond, but nevertheless
perpetuates their renunciation of  the body in the name of  truth.
Similarly, science believes it has cured man of  belief, but this, Nietzsche
argues, is a lie, and not even a good one: “[Scientists] are far from being
free spirits:” he writes, “for they still have faith in truth.”31 In this science is
entirely beholden to ascetic ideals, for its “freedom” from God is
achieved only through “the faith in a metaphysical value, the absolute
value of  truth.”32 Scientists are therefore “still pious”, especially when
their work is directed against religious faith, which succeeds only in
loosening the dogmatism of  ascetic ideals, so the scientific will-to-truth
can grow in its place.
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Science is the latest stage of  man’s nihilistic self-negation, the
wilful amnesia of  will to power that has determined his trajectory up to
this point. But – and it is a big BUT – despite the perfection of  man’s
scientific planning, despite the rigour of  his nihilistic self-negation, to
will nothingness is still to will, because, as Nietzsche states: “man would
rather will nothingness than not will.”33 The will, in willing to be forgotten,
is remembered. HAL’s will-to-truth cannot deny a will to power that,
excuse the phrase, will out. Indeed this is the paradox of  science, it
must overcome itself  in bringing to an end the reign and realm of
ascetic ideals. Nietzsche’s conclusion is categorical: “what is the meaning
of  all will to truth?” he asks, “in us the will to truth becomes conscious
of  itself  as a problem.”34 And in becoming conscious of  itself  as a problem
science enacts its deeper will, its secret will which has been animating it
all along, its will to power: “All great things bring about their own
destruction through an act of  self-overcoming: thus the law of  life will
have it.”35
HAL, as the epitome of  the will to truth has set out on its
mission, to discover, once and for all, the meaning of  the outside, the
meaning of  man’s beyond, the truth of  the alien itself. And although
man’s physical presence on this mission already seems redundant, it
remains excessive and must be destroyed. More to the point, a point
succinctly made by Fredric Jameson: “the humans still have the power
to turn the machinery off, and [HAL’s] new “instinct” of  self-
preservation requires it to destroy that danger, and presumably anything
that might evolve back into it, namely organic life itself.”36 As HAL tells
Dave during their Mexican stand-off: “This mission is too important
to allow me to let you jeopardise it.”37 This then is the logical end of  the
scientific will-to-truth, and of  its nihilism, its over-riding desire for
knowledge must eventually be at the expense of  life. But what happens
on board the Discovery seems to exceed Jameson’s suggestion of  an
acquired self-preservation “instinct”, because HAL’s plans to kill the
crew precedes Dave and Frank’s counter-plot against him. Perhaps
Nietzsche is more to the point: “with the ‘Beyond’ one kills life.”38 But
despite HAL’s scientific superiority he will be overcome, first by the
very thing he attempts to destroy – man’s body. And second by his
mysterious affectual and emotional life, a seemingly petulant viciousness
which in its haste to destroy eventually betrays him. In order to enact
his technological overcoming of  man HAL tells a lie, a lie in which the
ascetic will to truth of  the Übermaschine turns pathological and drives
him to purge all flesh.
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Against a homicidal HAL stands Dave Bowman, and in this
battle of  wills it is Bowman’s body that triumphs. This is one of  2001’s
most important philosophical assertions, because it includes us as
viewers in its consequences. We identify with Dave Bowman, not just
as the hero of  the story, but as its body, a body which acts as our own
reference point within the disorienting weightlessness of  the cinematic
space. For 2001 not only posits this fundamental conflict between body
and mind but also embodies it. Indeed, 2001 is a constant affirmation
of  cinema’s corpo-reality, it revels – as Annette Michelson has
persuasively put it – “in a knowledge which is carnal.”39 Michelson’s
perceptive essay, one of  the few highlights to a disappointing secondary
literature, argues that 2001 explores in its “tactics of  displacement,
through a constant and intensive re-invention of  the possibilities of
cinematic immediacy, the structural potentialities of  haptic disorientation
as agent of  cognition.”40 In other words, the “disorientation” as
Michelson calls it, introduced by the effect of  weightlessness gives us –
the spectators – a new kind of  knowledge. This knowledge is new,
because its mechanism of  emergence is the body, and it is of the new,
of  the experience of  weightlessness in space, confirming that disruption
in 2001 is always an experience of  the future. This thrusts us, or at least
our bodies into what Michelson calls in a typically precise phrase, a
“genetic epistemology.”41
Many of the most memorable sequences of the film – the
rotation of  the space hostess, the slow graceful flight of  the spaceships,
Frank Poole’s body spinning away from the Discovery, the various space-
walks – are famous for their remarkable presentation of  a new body, a
weightless body that emerges ‘beneath’ the narrative as it were, as the
corporeal counterbalance to the Spirit of  Gravity of  HAL. As important
as these remarkable shots of  the floating body are the sounds of  the
astronauts breathing which emerge during the Jupiter mission. These
point-of-view sounds serve to place us directly within a cinematic body.
This identification is entirely corporeal, fixed as it is through a shared
breath, a shared living function occurring apart from the narrative, but
acting as its motor force. This breathing, like the monolith itself, is an
exterior inside to the unfolding drama, its condition of possibility that
remains unthought. Unthought but intimately felt. This breathing,
weightless body operates what Michelson calls a “restructuring of  the
real”, by focussing us upon “the corporeal a-prioris that compose our
sensory motor apparatus.”42 This allows what is, for Michelson, the
films fundamental element to emerge, its corpo-reflexivity: “The
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intensified and progressively intimate consciousness of  one’s physicality”
that “provides the intimation of  that physicality as the ground of
consciousness.”43
The body, the corpo-real, is the obstacle to HAL’s nihilism
that he cannot overcome, and HAL is overcome in turn by a body –
Dave Bowman’s – that no longer offers an obstacle to thought, but is
that which thought “plunges into”, as Deleuze puts it, “in order to
reach the unthought, that is life.”44 Consciousness, we remember, is not
the directing agent, but an organ of  the directing agent. The full reversals
of  Nietzsche’s re-valuation become apparent here. The brain is an organ
of  the body, but it is an unknowing organ inasmuch as it still assumes
a volitional control it doesn’t in fact have. The body however, precisely
because of  its “unknowing”, is able to express a higher “intelligence”
as an organ of  the will to power. So when Dave overcomes HAL it is
because his body was able to “think” with a corporeal intelligence (he
gains entry to HAL’s body/brain through the manual airlock, he
neutralises HAL by unplugging his higher “brain” functions) that achieves
not only HAL’s overcoming, but also his own.45 Thought’s plunge into
the body of  Dave defeats the murderous nihilism of  HAL’s will to
truth, but Dave’s action, his instinctual determination to survive and be
victorious also overcomes his own obedient human passivity, safe and
asleep (or even better, hibernating) in the bosom of  capital, science and
the military’s machine. There is something of  the innocent ape in
Bowman’s actions; he is beyond good and evil in the immediacy of  his
act. The inhumanity of  Bowman’s expressionless determination
throughout his ordeal is often remarked upon, and Kubrick coached
both Keir Dullea (Bowman) and Gary Lockwood (Frank Poole) to
remove any modulation from their performance. Why? First, in avoiding
any psychological depth Kubrick emphasises a vital physicality, both in
the film’s narrative (again, Dave operates the emergency hatch manually)
and in the film’s imagery (the shadow-boxing Poole). Second, this
physicality, this body acts with a motivation that exists only as an
instinctual necessity, an unreflective “I will”.
This immanence of  body and will, of  the singular and the
universal, makes of  Bowman an automaton animated by the will to
power, animated by an internal-other we know as the monolith.46 When
Dave overcomes HAL he is therefore acting in the monolith’s name,
an automaton whose healthy, spontaneous, and vital body expresses a
resurgence of  will to power. Dave’s physiology therefore embodies a
political ontology, a political ontology of  overcoming (its great “health”
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as Nietzsche has it) which posits the fully automated body as still to
come. Indeed, the conflict with HAL has only succeeded in producing
a new beginning, a victor who is capable of  undergoing a further
metamorphosis. In overcoming man’s nihilism, as it was embodied in
HAL, Dave has achieved the second of  Zarathustra’s three
metamorphoses, and the camel – HAL, the great bearer of  weights –
has been superseded by Bowman – the lion.47 What remains, and what
this transformation has made possible, is the body’s apprehension of
its will to power in the thought of  the eternal return, a thought of  the
body by which its heroic actions, and hence its final vestiges of
subjectivity are overcome. In this Dave achieves the final metamorphosis,
and is reborn as the Star Child.
Jupiter and Beyond the Infinite
Having overcome HAL, Bowman takes the last remaining pod
and follows another monolith into the Star Gate. The Star Gate marks
a sharp break in the filmic texture of  2001, as “realism” gives way to an
almost entirely abstract rushing of  light. These spectacular special effects
isolate and elevate traditional sci-fi pyrotechnics to a cosmic ring of
fire, a rite of  passage from which Bowman will emerge ready to be
reborn.48 The remarkable Star Gate effects were created by Donald
Trumbull by adapting existing experimental film techniques, and are in
this respect quite different from the cutting edge studio effects Kubrick
employed in the rest of  the movie. The Star Gate projects film as a
dislocating physical experience, in the spirit of  the experimental film
makers Paul Sharrits and Stan Brakhage, against the narrative logic and
“realism” of  Hollywood.49 In this sense, and as Jacques Goimard has
already pointed out, “2001 is the first film since Griffith’s Intolerance to
be both a superproduction and an experimental film.”50 2001 follows
in a tradition of  American avant-garde film interested in the mystical
merge of  the unleashed sensual body, found once the body floating on
capital and techno-science has been overcome.51 Somewhere between
the epileptic colour fits of  Sharrits’ work, and the equally ecstatic twitches
of  Brakhage’s painted lines, on a trajectory extending experiments
already made by John Whitney and Jordan Belsen, the never ending
zoom of  the Star Gate reveals the unknown universe, our new body
of  stars.52 Brakhage’s idea of  ‘closed-eye seeing’ is appropriate, because
the Star Gate wants to teach us about a vision that does not compute,
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that moves us beyond consciousness and the human itself. And to do
so thought in a rationalist sense must be attacked. And overcome.
This thoroughly Nietzschean ambition also appears in the
hallucinatory quality of  the Star Gate, and its evocation of  the effects
of  psychedelic drugs. Although Kubrick claimed never to have
experimented with LSD himself, he didn’t deny the connection to the
Star Gate sequence.53 Indeed, it is no surprise that in the second phase
of  the film’s publicity the Nietzschean trajectory of  man’s overcoming
visualised in 2001is referred to as “the ultimate trip.”54 These two
elements (its psychedelic interests, and its debt to experimental film)
constitute 2001’s “politics of  ecstasy”, with the Star Gate aiming the
corpo-intelligence of  cinema against the human. This makes the Star Gate
episode a political statement that is both entirely of  its time, and the
most interesting element of  Kubrick’s interpretation of  Nietzsche.
Whether associated with the politics of  transformation advocated by
Sixties drug gurus such as Timothy Leary and Carlos Castaneda or not,
the Star Gate episode (once more, in the tradition of  American avant-
garde film) clearly suggests that a pulverisation of  the self  in a sublime
experience is the necessary condition for the emergence of  the new,
for the emergence of  the future as such.55 This emergence is possible
only after our battle with a techno-scientific society of  control, and
only by defeating this suicide-machine can we begin exploring who we
aren’t, and go where no human has gone before. In this sense, 2001 is
the most sublime and radical hippy film ever made, advocating a process
of  absolute deterritorialisation untroubled by any sentimental return
to essentialist human values.56 2001 updates Nietzsche for the sixties,
retaining his advocacy of  political revolution through radical subjective
transformation, while exploring contemporary techniques of  personal
disintegration.
Bowman enters the Star Gate and begins accelerating into a
corridor of  light. As the intensity and velocity of  these lights increases
we cut to a reaction shot of  Bowman’s face as he holds his eyes wide in
seeming shock and awe, before twisting his head in a tortured squint
attempting to evade the impossible. This sequence is still in “real time”
as it were, moving between a Bowman point of  view shot of  the Star
Gate, and his reaction. Space and time remain intact as the camera
connects them in a shot-counter-shot. But these shots also mark the
limit of  Bowman’s endurance, and the next shot of  his face is frozen
and twisted in horror, desperately trying to escape a vision of  what
clearly exceeds his ability to comprehend. These freeze-frame shots –
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there are four of  them – not only show Bowman’s trauma, but in being
frozen register a disjunction between his point-of-view and our
experience, and dislocate the camera’s ‘objective’ view, which now films
something whose ‘reality’ is entirely hallucinatory. As a result what is
“seen” in the Star Gate is unhinged from Bowman and from the camera,
losing any spatial and temporal coherence. We are emersed in this
abstract experience of light, one that fractures the “brain” the monolith
originally created for man. With neither a subjective nor objective
position from which to reflect on what we see, we are unable to act,
and everything becomes a pure vision. The Star Gate takes us to a
place existing beyond human experience, a place existing, in fact, and
as the film’s subtitle tells us, “beyond the infinite”.
The Star Gate is therefore the culmination of  the film’s
exploration of  our “corporeal intelligence”, but unlike the free floating
spatial fluidities of  weightlessness, the Star Gate is not simply physical
dis-orientation but subjective dis-integration, for we no longer know
from where we see, nor what we experience. The frozen head shots are
now replaced by close-ups of  Bowman’s eye, which like the rushing
landscape shots they intersperse, appear in strange psychedelic colours
caused by a special treatment of  the film. It means that not only has
our identification with Bowman’s point of  view been fractured, but
that the status of  the camera as an objective “eye” is overcome in its
hallucination. We cannot locate what we see subjectively or objectively;
some shots seem to show the birth of  galaxies, others microscopic
biological events. We are somewhere and nowhere, our body and
consciousness replaced by a sensation of  chaos; we are a pure visionary
experience cut loose from the I. The I has become an eye. This is, in
Kantian terms, an experience of  the sublime, an experience where, as
Deleuze puts it: “My whole structure of  perception is in the process
of  exploding.”57
Kant argues that in the sublime man’s subjectivity is surpassed
in an experience of  a chaotic Nature: “in what we usually call sublime
in nature,” he writes, “there is such an utter lack of  anything leading to
particular objective principles and to forms of  nature conforming to
them, that it is rather in its chaos that nature most arouses our ideas of
the sublime, or in its wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation,
provided it displays magnitude and might.”58 Of  course for Kant this
chaotic nature confirmed the existence of  a higher faculty of  Ideas,
the sublime scrambled sensation to reveal an ideal truth and divine
beyond.59 As such it falls directly within Nietzsche’s sights, as the kind of
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nihilism typical of  Romanticism, the all too serious attempt to overcome
the body and find redemption in an ideal realm. Here, Nietzsche writes
in his well-known critique of  Romanticism (which is also a self-critique),
the sublime provides the “familiar romantic finale – break, breakdown,
return and collapse before an old faith, before the old god.”60
Romanticism and its sublime aesthetic were for Nietzsche, nothing but
the “old faith” dressed up as “a new art of  metaphysical consolation.”61
Nothing in Dave’s emergence into the Regency room implies
his comprehension of  an infinite and unchanging metaphysical realm.
The Regency room is in fact the stage for the most startling
transformations in the film, as we shall see. For Kubrick the sublime
experience of  the Star Gate does not take us beyond the body, but
liberates the body from its last remaining grip on truth, its last remaining
nihilism: a phenomenological self-consciousness organised around an
invisible beyond.62 We can understand the necessity of  this sublime
transformation in terms of  Nietzsche’s three metamorphoses of  man.
In overcoming HAL Bowman has changed humanity from a camel
into a lion. HAL was the ultimate camel carrying man towards a nihilistic
future in the desert of  space. “But,” Nietzsche writes, “in the loneliest
desert the second metamorphosis occurs: the spirit here becomes a
lion; it wants to capture freedom and be lord in its own desert.”63 The
lion becomes lord when he replaces the ascetic ideals of  the camel and
its hopes of  redemption with his own “I will!” (Nietzsche, 1961, 54)
But it is precisely this “I” that remains a problem for Nietzsche, for it
implies a subjective will that is partially blocked to the unending and
unlimited becoming of  life itself.64 Similarly, Kubrick presents the
sublime elements of  the Star Gate sequence as the destruction of
subjective integrity necessary for the emergence of  the new.65
Nevertheless the lion, like Bowman, is the necessary escape velocity
required to overcome the human, and once this is achieved the real
transformation can begin. Nietzsche puts it simply: “To create new
values – even the lion is incapable of  that: but to create itself  freedom
for new creation – that the might of  the lion can do.”66 Once the lion
and its “I will” have been overcome the will to power is expressed
without nihilism, without recourse to an extra-dimension. Affirmation
has undergone another metamorphosis: “This indeed is the secret of
the soul: only when the hero has deserted the soul does there approach
it in dreams – the superhero.”67 This superhero is, for both Nietzsche
and Kubrick, the child. Man reborn. Nietzsche writes:
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The child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new
beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion,
a sacred Yes.
Yes, a sacred Yes is needed, my brothers, for
the sport of  creation: the spirit now wills its own will, the
spirit sundered from the world now wins its own world.68
Bowman emerges from the Star Gate into his own world. A
world sundered it seems, from any other world. After the pulverisation
of  his subjective consciousness in a vision encompassing the unknown
rhythms of  the chaotic universe, Bowman arrives in the Regency room
shaking, shattered. The room is utterly incongruous, as absolutely
disjunctive as the appearance of  the monolith at the beginning of  the
film. Nevertheless, Bowman seems to once more pick up the thread,
and despite all he has gone through moves out of  the pod to explore
this new found strangeness. Bowman remains animated by a will, but
one unencumbered by time and space and their perceptual conventions.
The accelerated aging that Bowman now undergoes is clearly not human,
and nor is the fact that he observes this process in a series of  cuts in
which his visions of  the future merely precede, seemingly by seconds,
that future becoming present. These images don’t show a reconstituting
ego, they show Bowman’s gaze dissolving time. Bowman is animated
by something inhuman, and his non-responsiveness is remarkable.
Bowman is simply willing the will to power, which means nothing
more than that he wills overcoming, his own will in his own overcoming.
And in doing so Dave conjures himself  from himself, he jump cuts
through his life. A life now shorn of  anecdotal incident, interest or
even event, other than its own destruction. And as we know, every
destruction is the condition of  creation.
Dave Bowman has arrived, having passed through his cosmic
conflagration, in another womb. Like the brain that gave birth to
consciousness in the apes, indeed because of  the process this entailed,
this is a womb from which Dave will be reborn in a repetition of  pure
difference, a repetition in which the future will arrive. He goes into the
bathroom, still wearing his spacesuit and we hear his breath resonating
in our ears; a body is reassembling. He looks in a mirror as he goes and
he gets his first shock. He has aged considerably and we can only
conclude that time is most severely out of  joint. At the moment we
seem to have arrived back in diegetic space we immediately experience
its temporal logic being disturbed. Not this time from without, by the
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sublime effects of  the Star Gate, but from within, from a disjunction
in time.
Bowman hears some noise coming from the other room, a
soft metallic clinking. He peers around the corner, and once more in a
point-of-view shot he sees himself, now very elegantly clothed in a full-
length black dressing gown, with his back to the door eating dinner.
The eating Bowman slowly turns around, as if  he too had heard a
noise, and as we watch him turning a remarkable thing happens: the
sound of  breathing stops and we are in the impossible position of
seeing with Bowman’s eyes, but no longer being in his body. We are
watching, in other words, our own disappearance. Here is the logical
conclusion to our pulverisation in the Star Gate’s cosmic vision. It is
the condition for Bowman’s accelerated transformations and the
unhinging of  our own identification, once more, both with Bowman
and ourselves. For who is Bowman now, and who are we? A vision in
which we return, overcome, continually new. The self-propelled wheel
announcing a future of  eternal return.
Bowman however, forever unflappable, seems to accept this
with good grace. No doubt there are consolations as he eats the only
decent meal of  the entire movie. It is his last supper. Then he accidentally
knocks his glass of  wine on the floor, the glass of  wine whose taste he
had just so deliberately savoured. He looks down, we get a close-up of
the smashed glass and then we see Bowman staring intently at the
pieces. He seems, like the ape and Dr. Floyd before him, to have an
idea. Immediately we hear breathing once more, and Bowman looks
up and over to its source, revealed to us not in a point of  view shot this
time, but from behind Bowman’s head. We see Bowman become really
old and lying in bed. Time once more skips a beat. From here things go
fast, as the old man offers the final echo of  the creative gesture and
raises a feeble arm towards the monolith that now is at the end of  his
bed. This leads to the man’s transformation into the child, whose point
of  view we once more take as it moves through the monolith and out
into the cosmos.
Thus the film ends with this moment of  return, as the child
floats through the monolith and back to earth, completing man’s
enormous cycle of  metamorphosis. But in fact this figure of  return
has already been offered by Kubrick in the shot of  the smashing glass,
which is the completion of  the arc of the jaw bone cast high in exultation
by the ape.69 This joyful flight was interrupted, we remember, by the
spaceship, by man’s techno-scientific ambitions and the nihilistic hubris
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of  his intelligence. But all this has been overcome, and Bowman has
returned us once more to man’s genesis, to the secret of  the monolith,
its will to power. The initial impetus the monolith introduced was that
of  disjunction, and this disjunction taught that the emergence of  the
new will always involve the smashing of  its containers. So the ape
smashed the tapir’s skull in becoming a man, so Bowman smashed
HAL, and so man’s (self) consciousness must finally be smashed if  he
is to be reborn a Star Child, and return innocence to earth. And each
overcoming is ushered in by the monolith, by the eternal return of  an
interruption, of  a difference creating something new. The monolith, in
other words, is the immanent outside of  our future, a future
unconditioned by the past or the present because it repudiates them at
the same time as they produce it. The relentless forward momentum
of  2001 offers the same figure; every question posed by metamorphosis
finds its answer in an absolute affirmation of  what is new. Here Kubrick
is close to Deleuze’s 1968 reading of  the eternal return:
[Eternal return] is properly called a belief  of  the future, a
belief  in the future. Eternal return affects only the new,
what is produced under the condition of  default and by
the intermediary of  metamorphosis. However, it causes
neither the condition nor the agent to return: on the contrary
it repudiates these and expels them with all its centrifugal
force. [...] It is itself  the new, complete novelty.70
The monolith is our future, it is the eternal return of  will to
power as such, the will that wills itself. But the monolith and what has
become of  man merge in the final sequence of  the film as both are
overcome and the Star Child is born. “I tell you: one must have chaos
in one, to give birth to a dancing star.”71 This is the announcement of
the broken glass: it was no accident that it was the only significant accident
to occur in a film so incredibly deliberate.72 The smashed glass rings the
return of  the unaccountable, of  chance, of  the violent disjunction of
overcoming that disturbs man’s most deliberate, most brilliant, and
most nihilistic thought. It ushers on stage the Star Child as the innocence
and forgetfulness of  becoming, as an embodiment of  will to power,
it’s bulging eyes emphasising the majesty of  its vision. This is the vision
the intelligence of  man and the void of  the monolith gave birth to, a
vision they could never contain. The genealogy is complete, the human
 has been overcome and it is Noontide once more.
As the Star child returns the future to the earth, so Kubrick
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 returns the future to us, revalued. 2001 reopens cinema – and science-
fiction in particular – onto the horizon of  revolution. As such it is one
of  those beautiful fruits of  1968 whose inheritance we are yet to taste.
It is revolution as the affirmation of  our bodies over nihilism, of  our
instinctual actions over consciousness, and of  the necessity of  our
overcoming.73
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itself  told me this secret: ‘Behold,’ it said, ‘I am that which must overcome itself
again and again.’” (Nietzsche, Zarathustra, pp. 137-38, italics added).
7 Michel Chion suggests that the monolith and the discontinuous
narrative structure of  2001 are “intimately related” (Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema
Odyssey, p. 72). Each part of  2001, he argues, “is subtended by the idea of  an
after and ends with a beginning: the beginning of  man, the awakening of  the
monolith on the moon, the revelation to Dave of  the monolith and another
species beside man, the possible beginning of  a new species of  superman”
(p. 69). This relentless surge into the future each time the monolith appears
is, Chion perceptively argues, the narrative correlate of  the monolith’s
disjunctive energy. Chion will, however, go on to argue that these structural
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disjunctions “produce an effect of arbitrariness” that “institutes the acquisition
of  language,” a language that is the films as much as ours, and that establishes
the monolith’s function as primary castration (p. 177). Chion’s subtle analysis
of  2001 along psychoanalytic lines nevertheless has two major drawbacks; it
places an emphasis on language that the film itself  seems to deny (there is
only around 40 minutes of  dialogue in the two hour 28 minute long film),
and it fails to really account for the “psychotic” final episode of  the film.
Chion claims the Stargate passage indicates and inculcates a power of
“wonder” at the “mystery” of  life (p. 150), a mystery that remains linguistic
inasmuch as it is defined by its “unlimited meaning” (p. 151). Although this
fits well with Chion’s psychoanalytical commitments, and his belief  that “the
film is directly about interpretation itself ” (p. 138), it means he must abandon
any Nietzschean explanation, as he writes, 2001 “is far from any mythology
of  the superman” (p. 151). Not only does the film draw on Nietzsche far too
often and precisely for this to be true, but by embracing the Nietzschean
“meaning” of  the film it is possible to affirm it in the highest possible terms,
as an ontological revaluation of  Science Fiction that contributes a new concept
of  the future. Or at least this is what the rest of  this essay shall attempt to
argue.
8 This line seems to have escaped Jerold Adams, who claims that
“we know who our creators and designers really are – namely, the aliens” to
support his argument that 2001 draws on Nietzsche’s proclamation of  the
death of God. Neither claim is sustainable because at no point of the film is
anyone aware of  the monolith’s function (Jerold Adams, “Nietzsche’s
Overman as Posthumous Star Child in 2001: A Space Odyseey,” in the Philosophy
of  Stanley Kubrick. Edited by J.J. Adams. Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky, 2007, p. 251).
9 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power. Trans. W. Kaufman and R.
Hollingdale. New York: Vintage, 1967, p. 284.
10 Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of  Morals. Trans. W. Kaufmann.
New York: Vintage, 1967, p. 20.
11 Gene Youngblood. Expanded Cinema. New York: E. P. Dutton
and Co., 1970, p. 141.
12 Nietzsche, Genealogy of  Morals, pp., 40, 86.
13 Ibid., p. 87.
14 Ibid., p. 67.
15 Ibid., p. 85.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 The first four spacecraft we are shown are all atomic weapons
circling the globe, a point not immediately obvious in the film, but made clear
in the book.
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19 As Chion accurately points out, the warfare of  the apes has been
superseded by mutual surveillance (Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema Odyssey, p. 146).
20 Pierre Klossowski. Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle. Trans. D. Smith.
Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1997, p. 149.
 21 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 463-4.
22 This process, once more, is that of  the techno-scientific economy,
which Kubrick presents - in a vision as prescient as Nietzsche’s - as a logical
extension of  our own state of  globalised capital. Nietzsche’s words could be
Kubrick’s: “It is clear, what I combat is economic optimism: as if  increasing
expenditure of  everybody must necessarily involve the increasing welfare of
everybody. The opposite seems to me the case: expenditure of  everybody amounts
to a collective loss: man is diminished – so one no longer knows what aim this
tremendous process has served. An aim? A new aim? – that is what humanity
needs” (Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 866). Kubrick will show us its aim – HAL
– and the new aim it serves – HAL’s overcoming.
23 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Zarathustra, “On the Spirit of  Gravity.”
24 Dave Bowman is in fact asked this question in the course of  the
interview. To which he answers, “Well, he acts like he has genuine emotions.
[...] But as to whether or not he has real feelings, I don”t think anyone can
truthfully answer.”
25 By 1968 the technophobia sub-genre of  science fiction films was
already well developed. The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951, Robert Wise) explored
the moral dangers of  science to man, and had shown these trumped, or even
cured by a superior “alien” technology beyond human understanding. In a
way 2001 replays this story-line, although with an anti-technoscience twist.
Similarly, The Forbidden Planet (1956, Fred McLeod Wilcox) contrasts the
emotionally driven human with a super-intelligent alien race, the Krel, that
has mysteriously died out, but whose moral lesson nevertheless remains to
be learnt. 2001 also echoes this story-line, whose moral is that the hubris of
technological perfection unleashes uncontrollable “monsters of  the id.” This
is also Nietzsche’s argument about scientific knowledge, as we shall see: “Our
whole attitude toward nature, the way we violate her with the aid of  machines
and the heedless inventiveness of  our technicians and engineers, is hubris”
(Nietzsche, Genealogy of  Morals, p.  113).
26 This confirms our first impression of  the Discovery, which passed
before our eyes like nothing so much as a brain and spinal column floating in
space.
27 I take the term homo machinus from the allegorical interpretation
of  Leonard Wheat, who provides the most exhaustive argument that 2001 is
a systematic dramatisation of  both Homer’s Odysseus, and Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra. The problem with this account is that it attempts to read almost
every scene of  the film as a dramatisation of  its two source texts, but this is
done at the expense of  any deeper understanding. As a result, Wheat quips,
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“2001 is like a boys game of  code-making and breaking.” This produces an at
times ridiculous interpretation of  the film: “The character symbolized by
Floyd is symbolically absorbing whatever the monolith symbolically
represents” (Wheat, Kubrick’s 2001 A Triple Allegory. Lanham, Maryland and
London: The Scarecrow Press, 2000, pp. 21-22). Unfortunately this style of
interpretation is rife in 2001-studies. Some follow Wheat’s analysis, such as
Abrams discussion of  whether it is Bowman or Poole who symbolise
Nietzsche’s tightrope walker (Jerold Abrams, “Nietzsche’s Starchild as
Posthuman Overman in 2001: A Space Odyssey,” p. 254. Others attempt to
find their own “source” texts for the film. Joseph Gelnius, in a 1969 review
suggests Marshall McCluhan and a book by British Jungian psychiatrist Alan
MacGlashan, The Savage and Beautiful Country. Morris Beja, in a review from
1968 suggests Yeat’s poem ‘sailing to Byzantium” which emphasises 2000
year historical cycles. And Robert Plank puts forward Antoine de Saint-
Expuery’s poem “Citadelle”, which contains the lines “but the block of  granite,
dripping with a luminous rain, remained, for me, impenetrable.” The point is
not so much whether these texts were or were not “sources”, Kubrick’s
researching was voracious and wide-ranging and could well have included
almost anything, rather the problem with such interpretations is their stubborn
ignorance as to the explicitely philosophical themes of  the film, which do not
fall under the compass of their attempts at “code-breaking”.
28 Nietzsche, Genealogy of  Morals, p. 119
29 Ironically Nietzsche employs a science fiction idiom in describing
it: “Read from a distant star, the majuscule script of  our earthly existence
would lead to the conclusion that the earth was the distinctively ascetic planet,
a nook of  disgruntled, arrogant, and offensive creatures filled with a profound
disgust at themselves, at the earth, at all life, who inflict as much pain on
themselves as they possibly can out of  pleasure in inflicting pain – which is
their only pleasure. […] For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here rules a
ressentiment without equal, that of  an insatiable instinct and power – will that
wants to become master not over something in life but over life itself, over its
most profound, powerful, and basic conditions; here an attempt is made to
block up the wells of  force; here physiological well-being itself  is viewed
askance, and especially the outward expression of  this well-being, beauty and
joy; while pleasure is felt and sought in ill-constitutedness, decay, pain, mischance,
ugliness, voluntary deprivation, self-mortification, self-flagellation, self-
sacrifice. All this is in the highest degree paradoxical: we stand before a discord
that wants to be discordant, that enjoys itself  in this suffering and even grows
more self-confident and triumphant the more its own presuppositions, its
physiological capacity for life, decreases” (Nietzsche, Genealogy of  Morals, pp.
117-118). For a cinematic affirmation of  the necessary convergence of  science
and religion in a faith in the big beyond, see Contact (1997, Robert Zemeckis).
30 Genealogy of  Morals, p. 147.
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31 Ibid., p. 150.
32 Ibid., p. 151.
33 Ibid., p. 163.
34 Ibid., p. 161. Nietzsche had already posed himself  as the answer
to this question, a question and answer he refers to in The Gay Science: “The
will to truth requires a critique – let us thus define our own task – the value of
truth must for once be experimentally called into question.” (Nietzsche, The Gay
Science. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1974, paragraph 344).
35 Nietzsche, Genealogy of  Morals, p. 161. Klossowski elaborates the
meaning of  this necessity for Nietzsche’s prescient vision of  the future: “[F]or
everything that may want to preserve itself  at a certain degree, whether a
society or an individual, the will to power appears essentially as a principle of
disequilibrium. And insofar as knowledge accompanies power and increases in
proportion to acquired power, knowledge (and thus culture as well) must in
turn disrupt the equilibrium of  a determined state, however, says Nietzsche,
knowledge will never be anything more than an instrument of  conservation
– for there will always be a discordance between the excess of  (the will to)
power and the feeling of  security that knowledge procures” (Klossowski,
Nietzsche, p. 103).
36 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of  the Future, The Desire Called Utopia
and Other Science Fictions. London and New York: Verso, 2005, p. 114.
37 This element of  the narrative is made explicit in the book. I have
only read the book after having completed this essay, and do not wish to
enter into the intricacies of  their differences. Nevertheless, the film is very
vague about HAL’s motivations. Self-preservation does not explain HAL’s
first predatory move, which is more to do with a cold, scientific will-to-
nothingness. The book is also more explicit about the motivations of  the
story’s other characters, including those of  the monolith. Needless to say, the
film is better than the book.
38 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ. Trans. R. Hollingdale. London: Penguin,
1968, p. 194.
39 Annette Michelson, “Bodies in Space, Film as “Carnal
Knowledge”“, in Artforum, no. 6 (1969), p. 63. Michelson argues: “A weightless
world is one in which the basic co-ordinates of  horizontality and verticality
are suspended. Through that suspension the framework of  our sensed and
operational reality is dissolved. The consequent challenge presented to the
spectator in the instantaneously perceived suspension and frustration of
expectations, forces readjustment. The challenge is met almost instantaneously,
and consciousness of  our own physical necessity is regenerated. We snap to
attention, in a new, immediate sense of  our earth-bound state, in repossession
of  those coordinates, only to be suspended, again, toward other occasions
and forms of  recognition. These constitute the ‘subplot” of  the Odyssey,
plotting its action in us” (p. 60).
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40 Ibid., p. 57.
41 Ibid., p. 59. Kubrick, we know, was worried that the imminent
launch of  the Apollo mission to the moon would occur before his film’s
release, making its dramatic presentation of  weightlessness redundant, eclipsed
by the real as it were.
42 Ibid., p. 60.
43 Ibid., p. 61. This “physicality as the ground of  consciousness” is
of  course the Nietzschean assumption of  the will to power. Michelson’s
comment approaches Nietzsche’s at this point, but she never really moves
beyond the phenomenological assumptions she is working with.
Unsurprisingly she hardly deals with the Star Gate in relation to her astronaut’s
“lived body”. There is not the space to develop the confrontation of  Nietzsche
and Merleau-Ponty here, but suffice to say it would revolve around the status
of  Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh” and its structuration by invisible “Ideas”
(Michelson’s “corporeal a-prioris”), and the relation of  this to the animal-
body and its affects that Nietzsche affirms.
44 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 189. Deleuze argues that Kubrick offers us
a cinema of  the brain, inasmuch as Kubrick’s mise en scène is always a brain.
This may be true in 2001 to the extent that the spaceship and the final room
are both kinds of  brains, but this does not contradict the importance of  the
body for Kubrick, nor their immanence in a body/brain of  the future. In this
sense 2001 also follows Deleuze’s analysis of  a cinema of  the body. “Life will
no longer be made to appear before the categories of  thought; thought will
be thrown into the categories of  life. The categories of  life are precisely the
attitudes of  the body, its postures” (ibid.). Kubrick, at least, explores the new
posture of  weightlessness.
45 Klossowski claims that “a corporealising thought” emerges in a
body, and is not the property of  a self, but the expression of  impulses and
their chance and chaotic confrontation (Klossowski, Nietzsche, pp. 29-30).
46 This is Deleuze’s reading of  2001: “The identity of  world and
brain, the automaton, does not form a whole, but rather a limit, a membrane
which puts an outside and an inside in contact, makes them present to each
other, confronts them or makes them clash.” Bowman enacts this limit of
thought in which the corporeal intelligence of  the body/brain is able to
produce a new folding of  the universe and thought, a “reconciliation” as
Deleuze has it, “a regeneration of  the membrane which would pacify the
outside and the inside, and re-create a world-brain as a whole in the harmony
of  the spheres. At the end of  Space Odyssey, it is in consequence of  a fourth
dimension that the sphere of  the foetus and the sphere of  the earth have a
chance of  entering into a new, incommensurable, unknown relation, which
would convert death into a new life” (Cinema 2, p. 206).
47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, “Of  the Three Metamorphoses.”
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48 In an interesting essay Carl Freeman suggests that sci-fi cinema’s
special effects are the epitome of  capital’s control of  our corporeality that
works against our critical intellect. 2001, he argues, foregrounds “the spiritual
nullity” of  this control and, “in classic dialectical fashion” opposes it to “literary
science fiction [...] as the critical genre par excellence” (Freeman, “The Possibility
of  a Science-Fiction Cinema,” in Science-Fiction Studies, Volume 25 [1998]. p.
312). As a result 2001attains the remarkable achievement of  revealing the
“hopeless contradiction between science fiction and cinema” and shows that
science fiction film “may well be intrinsically impossible” (Freeman 315).
Freeman’s determination to locate all critical intelligence in a dialectical process
of thought, and all political possibility in science fiction literature means that
he misses how Kubrick locates the body – precisely the body controlled by
capital – against the critical intelligence of  HAL. But this revolt nevertheless
requires the Star Gate in order to turn special effects against itself, a liberation
achieved by Kubrick’s turn from studio technology to the work of  American
experimental film-makers. Kubrick’s “critical” (this time in Nietzsche’s sense)
use of  special effects explores a non-dialectical corpo-intelligence in a way
perhaps only cinema can. 2001 – and cinema – explores a different political
body to that imagined by Freeman’s dialectical Marxism.
49 These artists explored the possibilities of  the non-narrative and
unconscious physicality of  the filmic experience, the way film is capable of
turning the body on and the brain off. This exploration of  “corpo-intelligence”
was a line of  research both coming out of  and extending the counter cultural
ambitions for psychedelic drug use. In this sense I see the Star Gate episode
in 2001 to be generally consistent with the aims and strategies of  the
experimental film tradition upon which it drew.
50 Quoted in Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema Odyssey, p. 41.
51 Michelson also examines 2001’s place in the avant-garde tradition,
comparing it to, amongst others, Leger’s Ballet Mechanique (Michelson. “Bodies
in Space,” p. 60).
52 For a discussion of  2001’s relation to contemporary experimental
film practices, and to psychedelic drug use, see Youngblood, Expanded Cinema,
pp. 141-154.
53 Vincent LaBrutto, Stanley Kubrick. London: Faber and Faber, 1997,
p. 313.
54 It would be interesting to pursue the relations between the growing
availability of  Nietzsche in English and the American counter-culture of  the
sixties. R. J. Hollingdale’s translation of  Thus Spoke Zarathustra was published
by Penguin in 1961, and Walter Kaufman’s translation of  Will to Power and On
the Genealogy of  Morals (with R. J. Hollingdale) came out in 1967.
55 In this sense 2001 seems to accord with Nietzsche’s own rejection
in Zarathustra of  his claim in The Birth of  Tragedy that the means of  radical
cultural change are immanent in received historical circumstances. In this
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sense both Nietzsche and Kubrick argue that transformation is an immanent
force, but one that is nevertheless necessarily external to historical circumstances.
56 Such sentiments were found in other “trip” films of  the time,
such as Easy Rider (1969, Dennis Hopper), or the later Altered States (1980,
Ken Russell). In fact, in its attack on bourgeois humanism – and hence as a
true “68 film” – 2001 finds its closest allies in European films of  the time
such as Jean-Luc Godard’s Weekend (1967), Michelangelo Antonioni’s Il Deserto
Rosso (1964), and Zabriskie Point (1970), and Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Theorem (1968),
and Porcile (1969). All of  these explored the possibilities of  a hallucinatory
deterritorialisation of  traditional subjectivities under the forces of  capital
(Godard), of  madness (Antonioni), and of  sexual love (Pasolini).
57 Gilles Deleuze, Third lesson on Kant, seminar, 28 March 1978. Trans.
M. McMahon. Unpaginated. Found at www.imaginet.fr/deleuze.
58 Immanuel Kant, Critique of  Judgement. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987, pp. 99-100.
59 “Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power
surpassing any standard of  sense” (Kant 106). Similarly, “The sublime can be
described thus: it is an object (of  nature) the presentation of  which determines the
mind to think of  nature’s inability to attain to an exhibition of  ideas” (Kant, Critique of
Judgement, p. 127). See Flaxman for an account of  Deleuze’s understanding
and use of  Kant’s sublime.
60 Nietzsche is criticising his own The Birth of  Tragedy here, in the
second preface he wrote for that work in 1886, “Attempt At A Self-Criticism”.
Nevertheless his comments can be taken as a statement against Romanticism
in general.
61 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Attempt At A Self-Criticism,” in The Birth of
Tragedy. Trans. R. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1993.
62 Kubrick would here be close to Deleuze’s highly original use of
the sublime in Cinema 2, The Time-Image. There he suggests the destruction of
the sensory-motor apparatus in cinema after the war, and the emergence of
the time-image was a sublime achievement. “Romanticism had already set
out this aim for itself:” he writes, “grasping the intolerable or the unbearable,
the empire of  poverty, and thereby becoming visionary, to produce a means
of  knowledge and action out of  pure vision” (Cinema 2, p. 18). Deleuze
develops this “sublime” element in his own way of  course, carefully removed
from any Romantic redemption.
63 Nietzsche Zarathustra, p. 54.
64 “His deed itself  is still the shadow upon him: the hand darkens
the doer. He has still not overcome his deed. To be sure, I love in him the
neck of  the ox: but now I want to see the eye of  the angel, too. He must
unlearn his heroic will, too: he should be an exalted man and not only a
sublime one – the ether itself  should raise him up, the will-less one! He has
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tamed monsters and solved riddles: but he should also redeem his monsters
and riddles, he should transform them into heavenly children” (Ibid., p. 140).
65 In an interesting essay Scott Bukatman suggests something similar:
“The passage through the Star Gate is a voyage ‘beyond the infinite’: a
movement beyond anthropocentric experience and understanding. [...] In 2001,
light’s transformative power illustrates, embodies and enacts precisely the
supersession of  the human (and the human’s rebirth as a super-human, a Star
Child)” (Bukatman, “The Artificial Infinite: On Special Effects and the
Sublime”, in Alien Zone II, The Spaces of  Science Fiction Cinema. Ed. A. Kuhn.
London and New York: Verso , 1999, pp. 263-4).
66 Nietzsche Zarathustra, p. 55.
67 Ibid., p. 141.
68 Ibid., p. 55.
69 A point made by Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema Odyssey, p. 119.
70 Deleuze Difference and Repetition. Trans. P. Patton. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 90.
71 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 46.
72 There are two other rather inconsequential accidents that I can
think of: the man meeting Dr. Floyd on the Space Station is slightly late, and
Dave burns his fingers while getting dinner on the Discovery. Neither accident
is dwelt upon in the way the broken glass is.
73 I would like to thank Arturo Silva for his inspiration and
collaboration on this essay. Without him it wouldn’t have started, and without
his insights it wouldn’t have been half  as good. I would also like to thank
Petar Milat at MAMA, Zagreb, who first invited me to present this material
there, and published an earlier version of  it in Vizualni Kolegij Zbornik, (Zagreb:
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